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This report documents the work accomplished in determining
t
• t:i•e impact that artificial-gravity opera
.
tions would have on the
overall probability of Early Orbital Space Station mission success.
It fulfills the requirements of Technical Directive 2-4-15, Sub-
r
` task 5 1 dated 26 January 1968.
This analysis evaluated both qualitatively and quantitatively
the effects on overall EOSS mission reliability
	
gof havi ng artificial-
gravity operations performed as part of the mission.	 The .additional
hardware and operations required for the artificial-gravity mode
results in a reduction in overall EOSS reliability of approximately
1.0 . per•ce.nt .	 '. .
_ Artificial-g operations will result in additions and changes
to the following systems which will degrade the overall relia-
'bility of the space station and/or degrade their operation:
1.	 Electrical Power System
2.	 Reaction .Control System	 -	 .•
'i stem3.	 Stabilization and Control Sy 	 .
4.	 Communication and Data Management System
5.	 Structural and Mechanical System
I^ 6.	 Environmental Control/Life Support Sys tem
^••^ 7.	 Crew Systems
It is recorrmended that analyses be performed as soon.. as
Li
possible to determine the impact of artificial
.
-9 operations-on
(1)	 Safety,	 Escape and Failure Dete:tion,and	 (2)	 .operations.
:.:
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1.0 INTRODUCTIO14
The purpose of this study is to provide additional inforo ation
on the impact that artificial-gravity operations will have on the
probability of success of an Early Orbit-al Space Station
mission. This information is presented to further assist in
determining the mort. effective configuration to accomplish the
various mission goals under consideration.
Q	 The baseline Earl Orbital Space Station (FOSS) operates inY	 P	 P
a zero-g mode.	 It may-provide an onboard centrifuge as a thera-
peutic tool and/or an experiment for periodic conditioning of the
space station personnel. 	 Of necessity, the capacity of the
centrifuge would be limited.	 If experiment requirements or'-if
space experience	 (e.g., Apollo, MOL, Saturn I Workshop, etc.)
proves the need for continuous g-forces for long-te rim crew effective-
ness/health, a modification of the baseline EOSS configuration will
have to be made to provide this artificial-gravity condition.
The modification of the baseline EOSS configuration would.
take the form of providing for rotation of the entire space station.
A
This report treats the qualitative ana quantitative effects of the
modifications	 (i.e., hardware and operations) on the Laseline
configuration with res pect to the probability of.mission success.
,Artificial-g operations will result in additions and changes
u to the fol.owing systems which will degrade the overall rel a-
bility of the space station and/or degrade their operation:
1..
	 Electrical Power System
Lj 2.	 Reaction Control System
n
i
3. Stabilization and Control System
•.
4. Communication and Data Management System
' 5. Structural and Mechanical System
t 6. Environmental Control/Life Support System
7. Crew Systems
v
2
1p
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•	 2.0 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS
2.1 General
The LOSS will be capable of both zero- and artificial-gravity
operation. It will be required to have a rotational capability
to provide a contingency artificial-gravity mode of operation
that would be put into effect as an experiment. The artificial-
gravity environment will be produced by rotating the entire
space station. It is assumed that this alternate configuration
will retain all baseline EOSS capabilities.
The configuration considered for this analysis has the
spent S-II Stage attached to the FOSS. The S-II Stage is the
	
`i	 counterweight for the artificial-gravity operation. This con-
figuration solo*ion provides for (1) a maximum-length extension
(approximately 90 feet) between the space station and the counter-
weight (S-II Stage.) to attain the required 0.2-0.3 g-level er.,viron-
ment at the experiment area, (2) a means of spin-up and de-spin
for rotation, and (3) a system to provide stabilization and control.
Rotation of the space station will have a significant impact
on station operations, subsystems, interior layout and experiment
performance. Table 2.1. summarizes some of the impacts'of artificial-
gravity operation. The artificial-gravity mode will require more
functions and equipment than the baseline EOSS. This will result
in a degradation of reliability and safety (e.g., the -reliability
problem will , incr.ease with added complexity ,and - ckow hazards will
19
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increase due to the spin/de-spin dynamics of the space station,
probably cau-c ing abort or delay constraints). It is assumed that
the S-II Stage cannot ; *-nvi de additional services (e .g . , electrical
power, crew quarters, reaction control, etc.) to the FOSS.
2.2 Electrical Power System
The solar panels provided on the EOSS may not be designed for
spin operations. Modifications of the present solar panel design
concept to withstand the station rotation dynamics is likely.
In order to provide sufficient poorer, the space station will. 'have
to be operated in a solar orientation during rotation. This would
entail some propellant penalty. It may be possible to relocate
the solar panels and/or provide them with a gimballiAg capability
so that the array always will be solar oriented no matter what
orientation the space station has. Another alternate approach to
-consider is to provide an added power capability (e.g., fuel cells,
additional batteries, etc.) to meet the needs of the space station
while in the artificial-gravity mode of operation. It should be
noted that, with this alternate approach, the baseline EOSS orientation
is not precluded by * the artificial-gravity (.rotation) mode operations.
2.3 Reaction Control-System (RCS)
The artificial-gravity operaticnal mode for the LOSS will
have an impact on the RCS. The addition of r^-action motors,-
fuel, oxidizer, and pressurization systems to the baseline 'OSS
will be required to provide the required spin-up .and de-spin
4
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'1'^WLE; 2 . 1: If:PA''T OF' ARTI PfC1AT,-Ga W1TY Oi'i:&'RATIONS
ON EOSS BASELINE
IMPACT
Limits the number of experiments
that can be performed.
Interiors will require rearrange-
ment.
Provide added power capability
(e.g., batteries, fuel cells,
etc.) OR maintain solar orienta-
tion. Redesign of solar array
to withstand rotation dynamic
forces may be required.
Provide RCS in addition to
that present on the baseline.
Additional thrusters and propel-
lant are necessary.
Provide additional control logic
and mode switching. Gyroscopes
may precess abnormally during
artificial-gravity mode.
Provide sufficient support to CSM's
while they are docked to the EOSS
to withstand forces generated dur-
ing artificial-gravity operations,
Some experiments will be cur-
tailed during artificial-gravity
operations.
This system must be desi.gned and
added to the baseline EOSS
configuration.
It may be necessary to provide
new antenna and data links.
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capability. The special RCS arid propellant reo.uire:ments (i Vie.
precession control, orientation and orbit 'seeping as well as
D. spin-up andP	 P di e- spin functions	 will be providedP	 )	 Pi b Y the FOSS.	 An
increase in the unreliability of the baseline FOSS ccn£i^juration
will occur due to the additional har.dwarer and operational	 requi rentents.
Use of the S-II Stage as a counter-weight restricts the
location of the RCS to thp. forward end of the FOSS.
	
The use of
^t
the thrusters provided for zero-9 operation appears impractical
D
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a
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a
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because of their high propellant consumption. The added PC ,.; will
provide a slow, steady and continuous thrust to provide the neces-
aary spin to the space station. A counte n7ei.ght will be used
to accomplish the de-spin operations. The RCS will be used also
as a backup to the stabilization and control s ystem to accomplish
wobL le damping.
2.4 Stabilization and Control. S ystem (SC S)_
The demands upon the SCS will be increased by the artificial-
gravity-(rotating) mode requirement. With respect to the baseline
EOSS configuration, the added SCS elements and operations will
decrease the overall probability of success.
A major aspect of the artificial-gravity mode of operation
will be the influence of the space station's spin orientation
on the complexity of the control logic as well as on propellant
consumption. Table 2.2 presents a summary of thesour possible
^1
spin orientations. Any orientation, other than the spin-in-orbit
plane, will complicate orbit keeping. Relatively complex control
.logic and additional sensors will be . requi.red to control the RCS
(i.e., thrusting functions) during tiic, spin and or!)-it cycles.
r
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ORIENTATION
1. Spin-In-Orbit Plane
I fl.
2. Solar
i a
i a
0
3. Inertial
4. Random
i
TABLE 2.2:  S UN1MARY OI' POSSIBLE FOSS SPIN  ORI ENTA'1'IONS •
DESCRIPTION
The spin axis is normal to the
orbit plcaie. It must be precesscd
to compensate for orbit-plane
regression.
The spin axis is pointed at the
sun. This is the orientation
assumed for this analysis. It is
used primarily for the application/
function of the solar panels to
provide the necessary electrical
power. A suit tracker will be
required to precess the spin axis
to compensate for the Earth's
rotation about the sun.
The spin axis is positioned with
respect to an arbitrary inertial
reference. Operations for this
orientation are the some as those
for the spin-in-orbit plane.
The di •_ection of the spin axis is
uncontrolled except during spin-
up. After spin-up, the spin axis
is allowed to precess as distur-
bance torques dictate. Of the
four orientations, this one will
have the least propellant consump-
tion.
L.1
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Artificial-gravity operations will. require additional SCS
equipment. Table 2.3 summarizes the SCS equipment necessary for
this mode of operation. Primary 'control actuation during zero-g
operation (i.e., baseline EOSS configuration/mission) is to be
provided by three double-gimbal control moment gyros (DG CMG)
arranged in the NASA Langley SIXPAC configuration as used for the
It
7
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Apollo Telescope  Mount (ATM) . Two of these DG CMG's would be
used to provide primary control actuation for wobble damping
during art if icial-gravity operation (NOTE: RCS thrusters w 	 d
provide a backup for the dampinc+ mode) .
During artif:ic lal-gravity operation, the SCS inconjunction
with the RCS will be required to perform six operations. These
operations are as follows:
1. Orbit Keeping
2. Pre ,.:ession Control
3. Sun Tracking
4. Gravity Gradient
5. Spin-up
6. De-spin
The SCS defined for the zero-g anode of operation has the
necessary sensors to mechanize the artificial-gravity mode. The
rate gyros would be utilized to provide the necessary error
signals to the DG CMG's for wobble damping. However, additional
mode switching electronics and -con.,.Xol loges-- will be required
' for the SCS to provide the mechanization of--the artificial-gravity
(rotation) mode.
2.5 Structural and Mechanical Systemt
Stati.on rotation (i.e., artificial-gravity operation) will.
automatically provide an-up-down orientation reference for the
crew. Therefore, the space station ,-' interior equipment arrange-
ment must be adaptable to the artificial-gravity mode where the
J
i
9TABLE 2.3:  SUMMARY OF SCS EQUIPMENT FOR ARTIFICIAL-G
OPERATION
EQUIPMENT	 FUNCTION
	 I
Spin rate control
Orbit keeping
1. Rate GyA o and Electronics
2. Horizon Detectors and Electronics
(e.g., Thermistor Bolometer
Types)
^3. Masked Sun Sensor
4. Star Tracker.
5. Manual Controllers and Displays
6. Control Logic and Associated
Electronics
7. Double Gimbal Control Moment
Gyro
Attitude sensing
Attitude sensing
Manual control
Orbit keeping and preces-
sion control
Wobble damping
"upper" deck will act as a floor. It may be necessary to modify
the baseline EOSS configuration systems so that they can withstand
g-levels imposed in one direction during launch and the opposite
direction during the artificial-gravity mode of operations
Possible degradations within this system (i.e., airlock seals,
hatch deformation and seals, etc.) are possible...In additio:l, the
multiple docking adapter (MDA) muses be reinforced and provisions
made for additional support for the control and service modules
(CSM's) while dbcked to the space station in order to preclude
damage to the docking rings and their associated str-otural and
mechanical components when artificial-gravity operations are in
progress.
M
1t
2.6 Experiments
The defined experiment (i.e., baseline program) may have to
be curtailed, redesigned or redefined for operation during artificial-
gravity (rotation) operations. Most EOSS experiment installations
are designed'for use during zero-g operations and will be restricted
while the space station is in the rotating mode. In order to
increase the availability of the experiments during this peri -1 , it
may be necessary to provide the capability of operations involving
independent modules for the astronomy-astrophysics technology and/or
bioscience technology experiments. This contingency will entail a
further reliability degradation (Ref. 7) .
2.7 Counterweight Deployment System
The deployment system is responsible for the detachment and
progressive separation of the counterweight (i.e., spent, purged
and passive S-II Stage) from the space station. The design
under consideration is a rigid extension system providing an
extended'length of approximately 90 feet. The design concept is
a folded, octagoral cross-section truss divided into four sections
terminating into 30-inch segments of the S-III"S-IVB interstage.
The structure is deployed one section at a time through the action
of torsion bars. The added complexity and function of the deploy-
ment system will decrease the overall probability of baseline EOSS
mission success. (NOTE: Two basic: assumptions associated with
the use of the S-II as a counterweight for the artificial-gravity
operation are (1) the S-II Stage can be purged and passivated, and
(2) no moments will be generated during this process.)
ii
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2.8 Communications System
In order to maintain communication with the Earth, new,
additional antennas may have to be provided. In addition, new
and additional up- and down-links may have to be established.
This will. hold true for the telemetry data links also. This
added complexity will increase the unreliability of the baseline
EOSS configuration. It should be noted that all antennas (i.e.,
both baseline and added) will have to be designed and structured
to withstand the rotational,dynamic forces present duringJ
artificial-gravity operation.
11	
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3.0 QUANTITATIVE RELIABILITY A14ALYSIS
3.1 Genera:
The artificial-gravity mode of operations imposes significant
additional equipment and functional complexities on the baseline
EOSS configuration. Examples of some of the equipment and
changes specifically required for the artificial-gravity mode
that will increase the reliability problem are':
1. Additional functional requirements for double-gimbal
control moment gyros (DG CN;G) and rate gyros.
2. Logic changes and additions within the•stabilization
and control system (SCS) .
3: Modifications of the related displays and controls.
4, Added thrusters and associated control logic to the
reaction control system (RCS).
5. Modifications of the electrical system (i.e., solar array
structures and/or additional power sources such as fuel
cells) .
6. Added system to extend/deploy the counts weight (S-II
Stage) required for the artificial-gravity mode.
7. Modifications and additions to the communication system
(i.e., added antenna and up- and down-links as well as
strengthening the antenna structures).
S. Modification of the space station structural and mechanical
system.
F
I
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3.2 ^ roach and Results
i
The results of previous detailed anal1scs of artificial-
	 ^I
gravity modes of operation for space stations (i.e., ::OSS,
References 1, 2, 3 and 4; and MORL, Re£eren	 6) were analyzed
to determine' the percent increase in unreliability of the affected
systems duc to this mode. Table 3.1 surmmarizes the results of
this analysis. The applicable percentage was then applied to
the reliability goals (Reference 5) of the EOSS systems to deter-
	
(	 mine the impact of artificial-gravity operations on the overall
1
baseline FOSS probability of mission success. Table 3.2 summarizes
the results of this determination. 	 !
•	 The results of this evaluation indica:.e that thefe will be
1 a decrease in the overall reliability of the baseline EOSS mission
of approzimately 1.1 percent if the solar orientation is maintained.
However, if this is not possible due to other constraints (e.g.,
^Iexcessive propellant requirements, etc.) and fuel cells are
utilizecX to provide the required power, a decrease in the overall
reliability of approximately 71.1 percent will result.
	
i
The following example is provided to clarify the procedure
used in establishing the r e liability of the LOSS with artificial-g
	
.J	 operaticnns :
A. The following information about system A is obtained from
the applicable references:
1. Baseline system reliability (R : 0.835
2. Baseline system unreliability (Q B ): 0.180	 X
3. Increased ilnrelial;i.lity c?.ie to a_-tifici al-g operations
(AQ):
	 0.002
13
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B. The fractional increase in unreliability (A) is calculated:
A = Q4 = 0.002 L 0.011
•	 QR	 b.. 1$ d
C. The new reliability (RC;) of the comparable IJOSS system
(Ajciu-a to artificial-g operations is calculated:
R	 F:^ 1-A = 0. ^ is the FOSS baselineG	 B (	 )	 B'989 R	 where R B
system reliability.
I
fJ
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TABLE 3. 1: DETEPI .1I NATION OF PERCENT INC1 • EA: E •: IN
UNRELIABILITY DUE TO ARTI FICIAL-GRWITY OPERATIONS
System
Increased
Unreliability	 (1)
Percent
Increase in
Unreliability
Electrical Power None -
(0.06294)* (6.101)
Reaction Control 0.00003 0.010
Stabilization and 0.00169 1.052
Control
Structural and
Mechanical
Counterweight 0.00015 0.015
Deploym,-zt
Communication and 0.00010 0.010
Data :•ianagement
Environmental Control/ 0 -
Life Support
Crew Systems 0 -
TOTAL 0.00197 1.088(0.06491) * (7.189) *
NOTE: * Unreliability due to use of fuel cells in a
dant confi g uration to provide all required p
This may be reduced if batteries or a combin
of fuel cells, batteries and solar array are
instead of fuel cells alone.
**	 Some degradation may occur.
(? ; Derived from previous EOSS ar ;; ^nL oeL-^i? ^d
analyses (References 1, 3 and 6).
15
11
L)
U
0
a
0
0
D
D
D
a
n
a
D
19
D
C
0
R.
r
L^
TABLE 3.2: PROBABILITY OF FOSS MISSIOU SUCC::.'.-^$
Svstem
•
Reliability (1)
of LOSS
Baseline
Mission
Configuration
(KB)
Reliability(2)
of Alternate
(Artificial-g)
Mission
Configuration
(R G )
8	 Di :: ,. rence
RG
[%D =	 (1 - RB )	 l0u]
Electrical 0.9975 0.9975 -
Power (0.9366) * (E.101)
Reaction Control. 0.9950 0.9949 0.010
Stabilization 0.9974 0 . 9869 1.053
and Control r
Structural and 0.9978 0.9978** **
Mechanical
Counterweight - 0.9999 01015.
Deployment
Communication 0.9952 0.9951 0.010
and Data Manage- .
ment
Environmental 0.9975 0.9975 -
Control/Life
Support
Crew Systems 0.9976 0.9976 -
TOTAL 0.9783 0.9678 1.073
(0.9085)* (7.135)
NOTE: (1) Reliability values from reference 5 (Rpt. No. l•3-S-223-67).
(2) Estimated reliability values based on results of analyses
reported in references 1, 3 and 6.
*	 if fuel cells in a redundant configuration 'are used to provide
all required electrical power (i.e., if an ori(.-jltation other
than solar is used) . Reliability may increase if . fuel cells
are supplemented by additional batteries
-
and p4irtial power
available from solar array.
** Soi.ia degradation internal to the -space sty.r^	 -^	 n	 c	 a	 ^ti.oit ►1lllV OCCLi .
'	 16
4.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMLNOAT1ONS
4.1  Conclusloils
The artificial-gravity mode of operations ponds significant
increases in the complexity of the FOSS configuration. Additions
and changes to the following systems will degrade the overall
reliability of the space statiot.:
A. Electrical Power System
B. Reaction Control System
C. Stabilization and Control System
D. Communication and Data Management System
The remaining systems (i.e.., Structural and Mechanical, Environ-
mental Control/Life Support, and Crew Systems) should'nut be
reduced in their reliability, but degradations may occur. In
addition, a new system must be added to the baseline EOSS in
'order to accomplish the eeployment of the S-II Stage count-.^rweight
This added system will degrade the overall reliability cif the EOSS
also.
The total reliability degradation due to the artificial-
gravity mode of *operations will be on the order of 1.1 percent if a
solar orientation of the space station is maintained during the
rotation mode. If this orientation is precluded due to rther
considerations, the degradation in overall reliability will be on
the order of 7.1 percent. This is due to the necessity of utilizing
fuel cells as a power source, rather than the solar array to
supply the required power while the FOSS is in the artificial-
gravity mode .
l^
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4.2 Recomumendations
As soon as possible, consideration must be given to the
impact that artificial-gravity operations will. have on Safety aria
the probability of
can be undockea pr
rotation will have
The effect
and reliability of
crew survival. The question of wnether the CSM's
for to the ckniplete cessation of space station
to be answered.
of the art-ificia]-gravity mode on the operation
Present designs and proposed hardware is unknown;
for example, (1) hatches and/or airlock seals may have to be
rode signed,(2) operation of gyroscopes will have to be analyzed
to determine if unwarranted precessions will occur duc to changes
in `he gravity environment, and (3) functioning of the, Guidance and
Navigation Computer to red-t to moments generated during spin-up,g	 P	 9	 9	 ,P	 P
r• spin and de-spin will have to be studied. Detailed analyses should
be conducted to determine the effects of artificial-gravity operations
of present zero-g designs and operations.
A determination and analysis of rotational dynamic effects
J	 on docked CSM's is needed. There is a likelihood that the docking
rings/multiple docking adapter (MDA) and/or the docked CSM/LCSM
may be damaged during artificial-gravity o perations (i.e., forces
' generated by and exerted during spin-up, spin and de-spin operations
could cause failure and/or degradation).	 Supporting structures
may be required to insure against failure.
Whether or not the space station is .i,aintained in a solar
orientation,	 the solar arrays, designed for a zero-gravity environ-
• ment, probably w-:12	 have	 tc be moth. f ILed of redosie,ned struc'-.ur"I ly
(acldc-d anO/or	 (foldr.d	 arid	 rct.rac,ec',
. is •
1 .0
space station rotation) to survive the artificial-gravity mode
of operations. Therefore, this aspect of the impact of artificial-
gravity operations should be analyze? in more detail.
D
D. .
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. . A determination should be made as to the amount of
reduction in *experiment activity that will be =,cceptable during
the periods of space station rotation. Consideration may have
to be given to utilizing independent modules (i.e., for astronomy-
astrophysics --rd/or bioscience technology experiments) to accom-
pli.5h the required program of experiments.
. Other means of attaining space station rotation should
be considered. An alternate to utilizing thrusters of one kind
or another may be the use of electrical energy driving a reaction
flywheel to rotate the space station (sce Journal of Spacecraft
and Rockets, Vol. 4, No. 1, January 1967, "A New Concept in
Artificial Gravity Systems" by C. A. Lindley, Aerospace Corporation).
Consideration must be given to the problem of verification/
r	 qualification testing when artificial-gravity operations must be
Ll	
accounted for.
The impact of artificial-gravity operations on the failure
detection s y stem must be evaluated. In addi'.ion, the safety and
escape contingency modes during periods of space station rotationg
n	 must be determined.
. Artificial-gravity operations must be considered when
planning logistics and resupply operations.
The effect of artificial-gravity operations on EVA and
indepcnd_?nt module operations sho-,.sid bo determi ned.
19
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